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Abstract
Present bias, the tendency to weigh costs and benefits incurred in the present too heavily, is one of
the most widespread human behavioral biases. It has also been the subject of extensive study in the be-
havioral economics literature. While the simplest models assume that decision-making agents are naive,
reasoning about the future without taking their bias into account, there is considerable evidence that peo-
ple often behave in ways that are sophisticated with respect to present bias, making plans based on the
belief that they will be present-biased in the future. For example, committing to a course of action to re-
duce future opportunities for procrastination or overconsumption are instances of sophisticated behavior
in everyday life.
Models of sophisticated behavior have lacked an underlying formalism that allows one to reason
over the full space of multi-step tasks that a sophisticated agent might face, and this has made it cor-
respondingly difficult to make comparative or worst-case statements about the performance of sophis-
ticated agents in arbitrary scenarios. In this paper, we incorporate the framework of sophistication into
a graph-theoretic model that we used in recent work for modeling naive agents. This new synthesis of
two formalisms — sophistication and graph-theoretic planning — uncovers a rich structure that wasn’t
apparent in the earlier behavioral economics work on this problem, including a range of findings that
shed new light on sophisticated behavior.
In particular, our graph-theoretic model makes two kinds of new results possible. First, we give
tight worst-case bounds on the performance of sophisticated agents in arbitrary multi-step tasks relative
to the optimal plan, along with worst-case bounds for related questions. Second, the flexibility of our
formalism makes it possible to identify new phenomena about sophisticated agents that had not been
seen in prior literature: these include a surprising non-monotonic property in the use of rewards to
motivate sophisticated agents; a sharp distinction in the performance of agents who overestimate versus
underestimate their level of present bias; and a framework for reasoning about commitment devices that
shows how certain classes of commitments can produce large gains for arbitrary tasks.
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1 Introduction
In many everyday situations, people have a tendency to focus too heavily on costs and benefits that are
incurred immediately, rather than balancing them against costs and benefits in the future. We often pro-
crastinate, for example, because we don’t feel like doing a task in the present moment, even when there are
concrete reasons why doing it now would be a better decision than doing it later. Or we consume or spend
too much because the immediate rewards are so salient that they outweigh greater long-term benefits.
In behavioral economics, these errors in decision-making are collectively referred to as present bias [1, 10,
11], and they constitute one of the most widespread human behavioral biases. Due to its range of applica-
bility, present bias has been the subject of extensive study [5, 3], including both empirical and experimental
components as well as theoretical models.
Modeling Present Bias We imagine an agent contemplating a sequence of decisions in which they incur
a payoff of ut at a point t steps into the future. Classical models of planning posit that an agent who is
consistently discounting the future will value this payoff in the present step at δtut, for a fixed parameter
δ ≤ 1. This form of exponential discounting has the property that in the next step, the relative values of all
payoffs look just as they did in the present step, only shifted by a factor δ.
Most current models of present bias begin from the principle of quasi-hyperbolic discounting [7], which for
our purposes here can be described as follows. The behavior of a present-biased agent is governed not just
by standard exponential discounting but also by an additional parameter b > 1. Payoffs that the agent incurs
in the present step are increased by a factor of b relative to all others, whereas payoffs t ≥ 1 steps into the
future continue to be reduced by δt. Thus, a present-biased agent perceives the payoff u0 in the present
step as bu0, and it perceives the payoff ut incurred t steps from now, for t ≥ 1, as δtut. This means that
the present has a fundamentally different payoff structure than every other step; it is consistent with a wide
range of studies showing that people view the difference between “today” and “tomorrow” in a qualitatively
different way than the difference between “t days from now” and “t+ 1 days from now,” for any t ≥ 1 [5].
The issues that we are interested in here emerge already when δ = 1— i.e. when the future is not discounted,
so that only the present-bias parameter b > 1 is playing a role. In this paper we focus principally on the
case of δ = 1 and b > 1 as it allows us to separate to an extent the role of present bias from the effects of
traditional exponential discounting.
Naivete and Sophistication Perhaps the fundamental distinction among present-bias models based on
quasi-hyperbolic discounting is the contrast between naive agents and sophisticated agents, an issue brought
into focus by influential work of O’Donoghue and Rabin [8, 9]. Naive agents weigh the present payoff more
highly than future ones (by the underlying factor of b > 1), but when planning for the future, they naively
believe that they will not suffer from this bias in future steps. Sophisticated agents also weigh the present
payoff more highly than future ones, but they formulate plans with the understanding that they will also
experience this bias in their future decision-making.
It is useful to work through the differences between naive and sophisticated planning — and the contrast
of both with optimal planning — in some simple concrete instances. We begin with two examples adapted
from O’Donoghue and Rabin [8, 9].
A 2-period example. First, suppose that a present-biased agent with bias parameter b > 1 can
perform a task today for a cost of 1, or they can perform it tomorrow for a cost of c, where
1 < c < b. (Imagine for example, that they need to finish writing a report, and are deciding
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on Thursday whether to do it Thursday night or Friday night; having to work late Friday night
comes at a higher cost by a factor of c.) Both the naive and the sophisticated agent will reason
that performing the task today comes at a perceived cost of b (since that is b times higher than
its true cost, reflecting their distaste for having to do things now), while performing the task
tomorrow comes at a perceived cost of c < b (the true cost without multiplication by b). As
a result, both will wait and do the task tomorrow; and in this way, both are behaving sub-
optimally, since they could achieve a cost of 1 < c by doing the task today.
There is already a crucial subtlety in the 2-period example, in that the naive and sophisticated agents are
making the same sub-optimal choice but for different reasons. The naive agent’s reasoning is in a sense
simpler: they mistakenly believe that when tomorrow comes, they will perceive the cost of performing the
task as c. The sophisticated agent knows that tomorrow they will perceive the cost as bc, but this is not part
of their optimization: they want to minimize the cost as they perceive it in the present, which is b times the
cost in the present period, plus the true cost in all future periods.
In this sense, the easiest way to think about the behavior of a sophisticated agent is in terms of the following
metaphor from the behavioral economics literature. Imagine that when any agent — optimal, naive, or
sophisticated — engages in planning over multiple time periods, the decision-making in each period is
controlled by a conceptually different copy of the agent: in period t, the “period-t self” reasons about what
to do, and then hands off control of future decision-making to the “period-(t + 1) self.” The conceptual
value in thinking about different selves is that for the period-t self, the present is in period t, and that can
induce a potentially different decision problem than the one faced by the period-(t + 1) self, for whom the
present is in period t+ 1.
Viewed this way, the different types of agents think about cost-minimization as follows.
• An optimal agent in period t is simply trying to minimize the sum of the costs incurred by itself and
all future selves (i.e. all period-t′ selves for t′ ≥ t).
• A naive agent in period t is selfish: it is also minimizing the sum of costs to its present and future
selves, but through a weighted sum that values the cost to its (present) period-t self a factor of b
times higher. However, it naively believes that all its future selves will reason differently, and in
particular as an optimal agent would. So it hands off control of future decision-making with a mistaken
understanding of how this decision-making will take place.
• Finally, a sophisticated agent in period t is also selfish: it is maximizing the same weighted sum of
costs to present and future selves that the naive agent is, weighing the cost to the present self a factor
of b higher. However, it knows that when it hands off decision-making control to its period-(t + 1)
self, this period-(t + 1) will also be a sophisticated agent with present-bias parameter b.
This is the sense in which the sophisticated agent can be aware of its bias but still behave sub-optimally:
like the naive agent, it wants to favor its present self (by a factor of b) using an objective function that also
includes the costs to future selves; but unlike the naive agent, it is realistic about the effect of its present
behavior on these costs.
The distinction between naive and sophisticated agents shows up strongly in the second of our two examples.
A 3-period example. Now suppose that a present-biased agent can perform a task Thursday for
a cost of 1, Friday for a cost of c, or Saturday for a cost of c2; and suppose we choose c so that
1 < c < b < c2. The naive agent believes that if it waits until Friday, then its “Friday self”
will behave optimally and do it right away (rather than incurring the higher cost on Saturday).
Unfortunately, when Friday comes, the naive agent prefers Saturday to Friday, and so incurs a
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cost of c2. The sophisticated agent knows that its Friday self will face a version of our previous
2-period example and will wait until Saturday, incurring a cost of c2. Hence on Thursday, the
sophisticated agent faces the following binary choice: do the task now, for a perceived cost of
b (since that is b times the true cost); or don’t do the task now, in which case decision-making
control is handed off to the Friday self for an eventual cost of c2. Since b < c2, the sophisticated
agent does the task right away, which is the optimal decision. It is making this decision because
it still values the cost incurred by its future selves (just at a factor of b less), and in this case the
consequence of delay on its future cost is simply too high (c2 > b) to justify delaying.
There is extensive evidence, experimentally and in everyday life, that both naive and sophisticated reasoning
play a large role in different contexts [5, 3]. We see the effects of naive reasoning when people repeatedly
push off a task into the future, always assuming that they’ll get to it soon. We see the effects of sophisticated
reasoning, for example, when people lock themselves into savings plans that make changes costly, or when
they spend effort to eliminate distractions from their work environment in order to reduce opportunities for
procrastination.
However, the complexity of sophisticated agent behavior has meant that the range of existing theoretical
results on the problem have in many cases required different, distinct formulations and analyses. As a result,
despite the long history of work on modeling sophisticated behavior theoretically, it has been a challenge to
speak in general about a sophisticated agent facing an arbitrary multi-step task, and to quantify over the set
of all such tasks so as to be able to make comparative statements or worst-case guarantees.
To take some stark examples of the limitations in our knowledge, there has not been a framework to answer
questions such as the following: How bad can a sophisticated agent’s performance be relative to the opti-
mum, for an arbitrary planning problem? How does the worst-case performance of a naive agent compare to
the worst-case performance of a sophisticated agent? Are there small systematic ways of modifying a task
to make it more favorable to the behavior of a sophisticated agent?
A Graph-Theoretic Model for Sophisticated Agents Our goal in the present work is to explore a frame-
work capable of producing precise guarantees about the performance of sophisticated agents in general
settings. For this purpose, we employ a graph-theoretic model of planning with present bias introduced in
recent work by two of the authors of the present paper [6]. In this earlier work, we used it to analyze naive
behavior, and here we extend it to analyze sophisticated behavior, as well as common generalizations of the
two. Given the major differences between naive and sophisticated behavior, the first issue is to adapt the
graph-theoretic model itself; following this, we will see that the underlying questions about agent behavior
become fundamentally different in the naive and sophisticated cases, and reveal a range of new phenomena.
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Figure 1: A present-biased agent must choose a path from s to t, where c is slightly smaller than b.
First, the model itself has the following simple but expressive structure. There is a directed acyclic graph
G, with costs on its edges, representing an implicit state space underlying an agent’s set of future decisions.
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The agent must travel from s to t in the graph G, and it seeks an s-t path that will minimize its cost in doing
so. The complication is that when the agent is at a node v, the costs of all edges out of v are multiplied up by
a factor b > 1. This increase in the costs out of the current node captures the effect of present bias: the cost
the agent is about to incur, due to its upcoming step out of v, appears to be larger than it did when viewed
from elsewhere in the graph.
It is useful to adapt the language of present and future selves to the graph-theoretic context. When the agent
at node v decides to follow an edge to node w, it is handing off decision-making control from its “node-v
self” to its “node-w self.” The naive agent believes (mistakenly) that the node-w self will plan a minimum-
cost path to the target node t. The sophisticated agent correctly understands that the node-w self will also be
a sophisticated present-biased agent. It therefore chooses this next node w with this consideration in mind,
to minimize b times the cost of the immediately next edge (the cost to its present self, scaled up by b) plus
the cost of all remaining edges on the path that its future selves will collectively construct.
As an illustration, we can easily encode the two O’Donoghue-Rabin examples discussed earlier via the
two small graphs in Figure 1. In Figure 1a, representing the 2-period example, the direct edge from s to
t corresponds to performing the task immediately, while moving from s to v1 corresponds to waiting until
tomorrow to do the task. In Figure 1b, representing the 3-period example, the direct edge from s to t again
corresponds to performing the task immediately, while moving to v1 corresponds to waiting until (at least)
Friday, and continuing on to v2 corresponds to waiting until Saturday. The reader can check that optimal,
naive, and sophisticated agents solve their respective path-planning problems on these two graphs as they do
in the examples. For example, the sophisticated agent in Figure 1a will move to v1, since from s it perceives
this path as costing c < b; but the sophisticated agent in Figure 1b will reason that its v1-self will move to
v2, for an eventual cost that it perceives as c2 > b, and so its s-self will move directly to t.
Overview of Results: Cost Ratios We are thus bringing together two formalisms, integrating the notion
of sophisticated behavior in present-biased agents [8, 9], into the graph-theoretic model of present-biased
planning [6]. This synthesis turns out to uncover a rich structure that wasn’t apparent in the long line
of earlier behavioral economics work, including a range of findings that shed new light on sophisticated
behavior.
We first consider the question of worst-case guarantees for sophisticated agents. The 2-period example
(rendered in graph-theoretic terms in Figure 1) shows that when c approaches b from below, the sophisticated
agent is doing a factor of b worse than optimal. Let us call this the cost ratio: the ratio of the biased agent’s
cost to the optimal cost. Can we find examples with cost ratios that are worse than in this simple structure?
In fact, we can’t: in every graph instance, the cost incurred by the sophisticated agent is at most a factor
of b worse than the optimal cost. This tight bound is independent of the size of the graph; given that the
cost incurred by a naive agent can be exponentially worse in the size of the graph [6], this is a first striking
indication of the power of sophistication in general instances.
We then consider the same question for a common generalization of naivete and sophistication — the notion
of partial naivete introduced in O’Donoghue and Rabin’s work [9]. A partially naive agent is aware of its
present bias, but might be wrong about the value of its parameter b; in particular, it may believe its bias
parameter to be b′ 6= b, and to plan based on the assumption that the parameter is b′. Thus, a sophisticated
agent has b′ = b, (because it knows its true bias) while a naive agent has b′ = 1 (because it believes that it
has no bias). How does the worst-case performance of a partially naive agent vary in the value of b′?1
1O’Donoghue and Rabin consider only the case of b′ ≤ b, when agents underestimate their present bias, as naive agents do in
an extreme sense. But the case of b′ > b is interesting as well, and forms a powerful contrast as we will see.
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We show that there is a surprisingly sharp transition in performance as we vary b′, with the fully sophisticated
case b′ = b forming the boundary of the transition. Specifically, agents who are pessimistic, believing that
they overweight costs by a factor of b′ > b, have a worst-case cost ratio of at most b′; but optimistic agents,
who believe that they overweight costs by a factor less than b, can perform as badly as naive agents, with an
exponential cost ratio.
Overview of Results: Rewards and Commitment Devices We next consider extensions of the basic
model that incorporate rewards in addition to costs, again finding new phenomena in sophisticated behavior.
First, we consider the case in which the agent is not required to reach the target node t; instead, there is a
reward R at t, and the agent collects the reward only if it reaches t. The agent thus faces the question both
of whether to attempt to reach t, and if so then which path to follow. Naive agents will sometimes start on a
path to t and then give up partway through the path, but a sophisticated agent will never do this; because it
correctly predicts its future decision-making, it is able to determine ahead of time whether it will be able to
get from s to t or not.
Despite this, it turns out to be quite complex to understand the set of feasible rewards that will cause a
sophisticated agent to travel from s to t. In particular, we discover a novel Braess-Paradox-like phenomenon:
there are instances in which the agent will decide to traverse the graph for a reward R, but will decide
not to traverse the graph for a certain larger reward R′ > R. This surprising but direct consequence of
sophistication does not appear to have analogues in the prior literature on present bias. The intuition behind
this phenomenon is that increasing the reward can make parts of the graph traversable to one of the agent’s
future selves that previously were not traversable, and this can lead an earlier self to perceive a higher cost.
This non-monotonicity implies that the set of feasible rewards does not necessarily form a connected set.
In fact, we show how to construct instances for which the set of feasible rewards consists of exponentially
many disjoint intervals.
We also consider the “pure reward” case in which an agent is seeking to collect rewards, rather than to
minimize costs, throughout its traversal of the graph. This is easily modeled in our framework by simply
having the edge weights in our directed acyclic graph G correspond to rewards rather than costs; as before,
the agent seeks a path in G from s to t, but the goal is now to traverse as much edge weight as possible.
O’Donoghue and Rabin [8, 9], had observed that there are cases where sophisticated agents tend to do badly
at collecting rewards in particular and we find this effect borne out and generalized to arbitrary instances in
the graph-theoretic model: there are instances on which a sophisticated agent will collect an exponentially
small fraction of the optimal reward. Interestingly, we also show that naive agents always collect at least
a 1/b fraction of the optimal reward, a striking reversal of the relative worst-case performance between
sophistication and naivete when the goal is gaining reward rather than minimizing cost.
Given that sophisticated agents can have very bad worst-case behavior in this reward-seeking case, it is a
natural setting to model the power of different kinds of commitment devices for improving their outcomes.
Commitment devices are familiar from both laboratory settings and everyday experience as mechanisms to
intentionally limit future options and thus cut down opportunities for sub-optimal behavior [2]. (A common
example is via commitments to physical fitness program [4]). Given our current model, we can ask how
powerful such commitment devices may be in reducing the effects of present bias with sophistication, and
how they can best be constructed.
In our setting, we can model commitment devices through operations that represent a controlled ability to
modify the graph instance at the outset. We show that such commitment devices have a powerful ability
to reduce the worst-case in reward-seeking instances, through results showing roughly that every instance
has a small modification that reduces the exponential worst-case to something much smaller. Perhaps most
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interesting among these is the fact that in any reward-seeking instance, and for any ε > 0, it is possible to
remove at most an ε fraction of the edges and bring the sophisticated agent’s performance on the modified
graph to within a factor of Ω(n−ε/2) of optimal — an exponential improvement in the general worst-case
guarantee compared to the performance on the unmodified graph.
2 Behavior of Sophisticated Agents and the Cost Ratio
A sophisticated agent plans similarly to a naive agent with present bias, but the sophisticated agent takes
into account the fact that its future selves will also exhibit present bias. This means that in order to compute
the path that it plans to take, it first computes the path that its future self will take starting from each
subsequent node in the topological ordering of the underlying directed acyclic graph G. Formally, we can
use the following recursive formula to define the cost Cs(u) of the path taken by a sophisticated agent with
present-bias parameter b, starting from a node u:
Cs(u) = c(u, Ss(u)) + Cs(Ss(u)) where Ss(u) = argmin
v:(u,v)∈E
b · c(u, v) + Cs(v).
Note that the path that the agent will take can be computed in polynomial time as the graph is a DAG and
Cs(u) only depends on vertices that come after u in the topological ordering of G.
To get a better understanding for the complexity of a sophisticated agent’s behavior, it is useful to go over an
example that illustrate some non-obvious consequences of sophistication. In particular, consider the graph
in Figure 2, where we will show how an agent with present bias b = 1 or b = 10 will traverse the same path,
but an agent with a present bias b = 2 strictly between them will traverse a different path. We note that this
is a contrast with naive agents, where the set of all b for which an agent traverses traverses a given path P
forms an interval [6].
To understand where this non-monotonic phenomenon comes from, we observe that for b = 1, the agent
acts optimally and takes the s→ u→ t path. However, for other values of b, we have the following:
• When b = 2, the sophisticated agent creates a different plan by reasoning about its future selves and
their perceived costs as follows. It finds that at v, the perceived cost of going from v to t is b · 5 = 10,
while the perceived cost of taking the v → w → t path is b · 0 + 49 = 49. Thus, with b = 2, the
agent standing at v would go directly from v to t. The sophisticated agent knows this while standing
at s, so when computing a path from s, it calculates that the perceived cost of the s → u → t path is
b · 3 + 2 = 8, while the perceived cost of the s → v → t path is b · 1 + 5 = 7. This means that it
chooses the s→ v → t path.
• When b = 10, the agent does something different — from v, its perceived cost of taking the v → t
path is b · 5 = 50, while its perceived cost of taking the v → w → t path is b · 0 + 49 = 49. Thus, if
it reached v, it would take the v → w → t path. Knowing this, when choosing a path from s, its only
options are s → u → t, which has perceived cost b · 3 + 2 = 32, and s → v → w → t, which has
perceived cost b · 1+49 = 59. Thus, it chooses to follow the s→ u→ t path — as the optimal agent
did, but for different reasons.
2.1 General Bounds on the Cost Ratio
A first natural question to ask is to compare the performance of sophisticated agents relative to optimal ones
(who will simply take the shortest path). In the introduction we have seen an example (Figure 1a) in which
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Figure 2: Graph G for which the paths for b = 1 and b = 10 are the same, but different from the path for
b = 2
the cost ratio between the cost exhibited by a sophisticated agent and the shortest path can be b. Here we
show that this cost ratio is indeed the worst attainable. This is in contrast to the cost ratio for naive agents,
which in the worst case can be exponential in the graph size.
Theorem 2.1 The cost ratio for a sophisticated agent is at most b.
Proof: Denote the cost of the optimal (i.e. min-cost) path from u by Co(u) and the node that follows u on
the optimal path by So(u). We use induction on the height of a node, defined as the number of edges in the
longest unweighted path from the node to t.
Inductive hypothesis: For a node u with height k, Cs(u) ≤ b · Co(u).
Base case: For a node u of height 1, Cs(u) = Co(u) ≤ b · Co(u), as the sophisticated agent will take the
optimal path when there are no paths to the goal longer than one step.
Inductive step: For a node u with height k + 1, let vs = Ss(u) and let vo = So(u). By definition, if
the sophisticated agent chose to go to vs from u instead of vo, that means that b · c(u, vs) + Cs(vs) ≤
b · c(u, vo) + Cs(vo). Since b > 1 and by definition Cs(u) = c(u, vs) + Cs(vs), this implies that Cs(u) ≤
b · c(u, vo) + Cs(vo). Recall that by the induction hypothesis we have that Cs(vo) ≤ b · Co(vo). Thus we
have that Cs(u) ≤ b · c(u, vo) + b · Co(vo) = b · Co(u). In the introduction we already observed
that there are instances in which a sophisticated agent is doing significantly better than a naive agent, and
now we have a strong worst-case guarantee for the cost ratio for a sophisticated agent. Given this, one might
suspect that sophisticated agents are always better off than naive ones in every instance. In fact, this is not
the case; we now show that there are instances in which a naive agent can do better than a sophisticated one
by a factor arbitrarily close to b. (Note that that by Theorem 2.1, it cannot exceed b.)
Claim 2.2 There are instances on which the cost incurred by a sophisticated agent can exceed the cost
incurred by a naive agent by a factor arbitrarily close to b.
Proof: Figure 3 shows how to construct such an instance. In the figure, we will think of x as very large
relative to b, and ε as very close to 0; at the end, we will let these parameters go toward their limits.
At the beginning, the naive agent perceives that the cost of the path s→ u→ t is bx+ 1 and the perceived
cost of the path s → w → t is bx + b − 2ε, so it chooses to go to u. Once at u, it chooses the path
u → v → t instead, for a total incurred cost of x + b − ε. The sophisticated agent, however, understands
that once it reaches u, it will proceed to v instead of t. Therefore, its perceived cost of a path going through
u is bx + b − ε, while the perceived cost of going through w is bx + b − 2ε. Therefore, it takes the path
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s → w → t for a total cost of bx + b − 2ε. The ratio of the sophisticated agent’s cost to the naive agent’s
cost is therefore (bx+ b−2ε)/(x+ b− ε). Hence, in the limit as x approaches infinity this ratio approaches
b.
s u
v
w
tx
0
1
0
b− ε
bx+ b− 2ε
Figure 3: Worst-case ratio for the cost of a sophisticated agent relative to a naive agent
2.1.1 Partially Naive Agents
Next, we observe that quantifying the cost ratio is interesting not only for sophisticated agents but also for
agents that are partially naive. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin [9], these agents are characterized by two
parameters: they have a true present-bias parameter of b, but they act based on a belief that their present-bias
parameter is b′. For sophisticated agents we have that b′ = b, while for partially naive agents we have b′ 6= b.
DellaVigna [3] summarizes several lines of evidence that most people are partially naive, in the sense that
they are optimistic about their present bias (b′ < b). In Appendix A we show that, in fact, optimistic agents
do not outperform naive agents in the worst case, and they can have exponential cost ratio. The situation is
very different for partially naive agents who are pessimistic (b′ > b); their cost ratio is bounded by b′.
Thus, there is an exponential transition in the worst-case cost ratio as we vary the partial naivete parameter
b′, with the case of sophistication b′ = b forming the boundary of the transition.
3 Motivating an Agent to Reach the Goal
We now adapt the model to consider cases in which a sophisticated agent must decide whether or not the task
is worth completing. We place a reward R at the goal vertex t, and the agent will only choose to continue
towards the goal if the reward at t is at least as large as the perceived cost of reaching t. At each node, the
agent chooses its path as before, but it also has the ability to abandon the traversal toward t at any point if
the perceived cost is higher than the reward. Furthermore, the agent engages in sophisticated reasoning as
before, and so it can determine for each future node v in G whether or not it would abandon its traversal if
it were at v, and it will avoid plans that take it to nodes at which it would abandon the traversal.
We can perform this reasoning to identify the nodes where the traversal of G will be abandoned, working
backward over a topological ordering of G. We give the details via an algorithm in the proof of the following
claim.
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Claim 3.1 Given a graph G and a reward R placed on t, we can determine in linear time whether or not
the agent will reach t, and if so, which path it will take.
Proof: Finding the path an agent takes through G can be done by a two-phase process. In the first phase,
we iteratively determine, for each node v, whether or not the agent would abandon the traversal starting
from v. We prune all the nodes for which the agent would abandon the traversal. Second, in the pruned
graph, G′, the agent will take the same path as agent would take in G′ without considering a reward. As any
vertex/edge not pruned by this process can be freely used by the agent, the agent will choose between them
as it does in the absence of a reward.
To prune the graph, we iterate over the vertices in reverse topological order. For each vertex v and each
edge e originating from it we can compute the perceived cost of a path that the agent will take; since the
subgraph starting from v is already pruned this path will be simply the path that an agent will traverse
without rewards. If this perceived cost is greater than R then the edge is pruned. If all the outgoing edges of
a vertex are pruned, we prune the vertex as well.
In this section we consider two types of questions regarding the model with a reward at the target node t.
In Section 3.1 we ask, given a graph G, which rewards will motivate the agent to reach t, and how different
rewards change both the agent’s decision to traverse the graph and the path the agent follows. In particular,
we show that the minimum reward required for motivating a sophisticated agent to reach t is at most b times
the minimum cost of a path in the absence of a reward; and moreover, the number of different paths the agent
takes as we vary the reward R can be exponential. In Section 3.2 we consider further modifications to the
graph as a means of motivating the agent to reach t. Specifically, we consider two methods for modifying
the graph: (i) deleting edges, where we show that a minimal subgraph motivating the agent to reach t must
be a path; and (ii) adding internal rewards on the edges, which we show is less powerful than edge deletion
by a factor of at least 2. We conclude this section by some open questions about rewards.
3.1 Traversable Rewards
For the remainder of this section, we let Rmin denote the minimum reward needed to motivate a sophisticated
agent to reach t in the graph G. Before turning to our results, we note the example in Figure 4, which shows
that the reward Rmin might motivate an agent to take a path other than the optimal one. The optimal path,
s → u → t, would require a reward of 6 to motivate the agent to follow it in isolation. However, the full
graph is not traversable for a reward of 6, since at u, the agent would prefer to follow the u → v → t
path, which has perceived cost 3. Note that the agent would not continue from w for a reward of 6, as the
perceived cost of going from w to t is 10. For a reward of 7, however, the agent would be willing to follow
the s→ u→ v → t path, and thus, Rmin = 7. For a reward of 10, the agent is now willing to go from w to
t. From v, it would choose the v → w → t path over the v → t path since it has a lower perceived cost. As
a result, from u, the perceived cost of going to v is 5 (because it knows that from v it would proceed to w),
while the perceived cost of going direclty to t is b · 2 = 4. This means that the agent follows the s→ u→ t
path.
Even though the minimum reward required to motivate the agent to traverse the graph can be greater than
the reward required to motivate the agent to follow the optimal path in isolation, we show that this minimum
reward is at most b times the cost of the optimal path. Specifically, we prove the following result :
Theorem 3.2 Let R be the minimal reward required to motivate a sophisticated agent to reach t. Then,
R ≤ b · Co(s)
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t
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5
Figure 4: Rmin may be larger than the minimum reward required to traverse any path in isolation.
Proof: First, we observe that finding a path when there is a reward is equivalent to removing all vertices
and edges from G that would be abandoned by the agent, and then finding a path in this subgraph G′. This
is because the agent ignores any vertices or edges that would lead to abandonment, but it still follows the
same formula of choosing the successor vertex that minimizes the perceived cost.
We proceed by induction on the height of the vertex, proving that at any vertex u, if we place a reward of at
least b · Co(u) on t, u will never be abandoned.
Base case: For a vertex of height 1 with some cost x to get to t, placing a reward of at least bx will always
motivate the agent to reach t, and thus the vertex will never be abandoned.
Inductive hypothesis: For a vertex v of height k, a reward of b ·Co(v) placed on t will never lead to v being
abandoned.
Inductive step: Let v be the next vertex on the optimal path from u to t, where u has height k + 1 and v
has height ≤ k. Consider placing a reward Ru ≥ b · Co(u) on t. For such a reward, by induction, v will not
be abandoned. Let x = c(u, v). We know that
Ru ≥ b · Co(u)
= bx+ b · Co(v)
≥ bx+ Cs(v) (by Theorem 2.1)
The last step holds because by induction, no vertex on the optimal path from v to t would be abandoned for a
reward of Ru. Choosing the path the agent would take from v is equivalent to pruning the abandoned nodes
from G and then choosing a path in the pruned G′ as if there is no reward. Since G′ contains the optimal
path from v to t and Cs(v) is the cost of the path taken by the agent in G′, we can use Theorem 2.1 to get
Cs(v) ≤ b · Co(v).
Since Ru ≥ bx+Cs(v), the reward is more than the perceived cost of going from u to t through v, meaning
there is at least one edge that the agent is willing to take leading out of u. Thus, u will never be abandoned
for Ru ≥ b · Co(u).
By induction, we see that s is never abandoned for a reward of at least b · Co(s), meaning that for such a
reward, there is a valid path from s to t in the pruned G′. Therefore, for any reward b ·Co(s) or higher, G is
traversable, meaning the minimum reward for which G is traversable is at most b · Co(s).
It is easy to see that the bound in Theorem 3.2 is tight by considering a graph which is only a single edge
with a cost c. For such a graph R = b · c and Co(s) = c. Furthermore, let Rd be the reward required to
traverse any path in G in isolation. Since Rd ≥ Co(s), we have that R ≤ b · Rd. Figure 5 shows that this
bound is tight as well.
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s v1 v2 · · · vn−1 vn t
1 1 1 1
b(1− ε) b(1− ε) b(1− ε) b(1− ε)
Figure 5: G such that R∗ = b+ n, R = b(n+ 1)(1 − ε)
u v
b(1− ε)
u · · · v
b(1−ε)
ε
ε ε ε ε
Figure 6: The curved edge represents b(1−ε)ε edges of cost ε
In the graph shown in Figure 5, the reward required for the path along the edges of cost 1 is R∗ = b+n, but
the minimum reward for which this graph is traversable is R = b(n+1)(1− ε). The curved edges represent
b(1−ε)
ε edges, each with a cost of ε, as described in Figure 6. This makes the perceived cost and the actual
cost of traversing the curved path approximately equal as ε goes to 0. As n increases, the ratio between R
and R∗ approaches b.
We know that both R and Cs(s) are bounded by b · Co(s) by Theorems 2.1 and 3.2. However, as shown in
Figure 7, neither is necessarily bounded by the other. With b = 2, in G1, R = 2 and Cs(s) = 1. In G2,
R = 11 and Cs(s) = 12.
s t
1
(a) In G1, R > Cs(s)
s u v
w
t
2 4
0
3
6
(b) In G2, Cs(s) > R
Figure 7: There is no strict relation between R and Cs(s). These examples use b = 2.
3.1.1 Path-counting over Different Rewards
As discussed in the introduction, it is a surprising fact that the agent’s decision to traverse the graph need
not be monotone in the reward R: it is possible for the agent to decide to traverse the graph for a reward R,
but to decide not to for a larger reward R′. We begin by illustrating this in a simple example:
Example 3.3 Consider the graph in Figure 8 with b = 2. We observe that G is traversable for R1 = 9 and
R3 = 11, but is not traversable for R2 = 10. This is because for a reward of 9, w is abandoned, as the
perceived cost of going from w to t is 10. This means that the only possible path is s → v → t, and the
perceived costs at s and v are 9 and 6 respectively. For a reward of 10, w is no longer abandoned, meaning
from v, the agent would choose to go to w instead of t. As a result, the perceived cost from s is 11, and the
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agent would be unwilling to start. For a reward of 11, the agent is willing to follow the s → v → w → t
path.
s v
w
t
3
0
3
5
Figure 8: For b = 2, the graph is traversable for R1 = 9 and R3 = 11 but not R2 = 10
Next we show that an agents can traverse exponentially many different path for different rewards.
Theorem 3.4 There exists a graph G, and a set S consisting of an exponential number of different rewards,
such that for every reward in S the agent will traverse a different path.
Proof: The graph shown in Figure 9 functions like a binary counter – each vi → vi+1 structure represents
a bit, where i = 0 corresponds to the least significant bit. If the agent goes directly from vi to vi+1, that
denotes a binary 0, while following the vi → wi → vi+1 path denotes a binary 1. With the proper choice of
b and c, we can get the agent to follow a path corresponding to each number between 0 and 2n − 1.
s v0 v1 v2 · · · vn−1 t
w0 w1 w2 wn−1
1 2 4 2n−10
0 0 0 0c 2c 4c c · 2n−1
Figure 9: Graph with exponentially many paths
Specifically, for a reward of 2n + (bc − 2)x, the agent will follow the path corresponding to the binary
representation of x (where x ≤ 2n−1), under the following conditions: (1) c > 1, (2) b ≥ c and (3) 1+ c =
bc. Note that the last condition implies that b < 2 because otherwise, we would have c ≤ 1. Furthermore,
the first and third conditions imply bc > 2 because 1 + c > 2. We defer the proof to Appendix B.1.
Moreover, by considering w0 to be the start vertex of this instance, we obtain an example in which the set of
rewards for which the agent will traverse the graph consists of exponentially many disjoint intervals, since
w0 is abandoned for reward 2n + (bc− 2)x with even values of x between 0 and 2n − 1.
3.2 Modifying the Graph
We now consider two methods of modifying the graph to reduce the reward required to make it traversable:
(i) deleting edges from the graph, and (ii) placing rewards on internal edges instead of just on t.
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3.2.1 Motivating Subgraphs and Edge Deletion
If we have the ability to delete edges from G, with a reward R at t, we can ask about the structure of a
minimal motivating subgraph: a subgraph of G with the property that the agent will traverse it, but will
not traverse any proper subgraph of it. For sophisticated agents a minimal motivating subgraph is always a
single path. Intuitively, we observe that if an agent is willing to traverse a path P as part of a larger graph G
for a reward R, then it is willing to traverse P in isolation for R. Next, we prove this and show an algorithm
for computing the minimal reward required to motivate the agent to reach t in any subgraph.
Claim 3.5 A minimal motivating subgraph of a graph G must be a single path.
Proof: For a given path P , the minimum reward required to motivate an agent to traverse that path in
isolation is just the maximum over all vertices of the perceived cost of that vertex. At a vertex u, the
perceived cost is b · c(u, v) plus the true cost of the path from v to t where v is the next vertex along P .
As long as the agent follows P , there is no graph of which P is a strict subgraph that requires a smaller
reward to be traversable. To see this, let R be the minimum required to motivate the agent to traverse P in
isolation. This means there is some vertex u such that the perceived cost of the portion of P from u to t is
R. If a reward R′ < R is placed on t, then the perceived cost of following P from u will be larger than the
reward, and therefore the agent will not follow P from u to t. This means that for any path P , if the agent
is unwilling to traverse P in isolation for a given reward, then it is unwilling to follow P in any graph of
which P is a strict subgraph. Thus, if the agent is willing to follow P for a given reward in a larger graph
G, then it is willing to follow P in isolation, meaning that P is a minimal motivating subgraph of G.
Claim 3.6 In polynomial time we can find the minimum R such that placing a reward of R at t and deleting
a subset of edges from G will motivate the agent to reach t in the resulting subgraph.
Proof: Given a graph G and a reward R, we can find a motivating subgraph traversable for with R placed
on t (if one exists) in linear time. To do so, we consider each vertex in reverse topological order. At each
vertex u, we choose the neighbor v such that v is not abandoned, the perceived cost of going to v from u
is no more than R, and the true cost of going through v is less than it is through any other neighbor that
satisfies the first two conditions. If no such neighbor exists, then u is abandoned. Since we process the
vertices in reverse topological ordering, when we consider u, we already know the true cost of the path
through v. Finally, we build a path by starting at s and following the choices of each vertex until we reach
t, and that path is a motivating subgraph for R. If s is abandoned, there is no path such that the perceived
cost at every point on that path is no more than R. If such a path existed, then no vertex on that path would
be abandoned by the above algorithm (as the next vertex on the path would always satisfy the conditions),
and so s would not be abandoned. Note that this only holds because at each vertex we minimize the true
cost over all possible successors. This ensures that the perceived cost at any subsequent vertex we consider
is minimized as well, so if there is any way for the perceived cost to be smaller than R along the entire path,
this algorithm will find it.
Let Rd be the minimum reward required to motivate the agent to reach t from s in any subgraph of G.
Equivalently, Rd is the minimum reward required to motivate the agent to reach t given that we can delete
arbitrarily many edges from the graph. Then, the above algorithm can find Rd in polynomial time simply by
binary searching over all rewards between Co(s) and b · Co(s) using the algorithm described above.
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3.2.2 Adding Internal Rewards to the Graph
We also consider a slightly less powerful model, in which instead of deleting edges, we place rewards on
internal edges instead of only on t. More precisely, the agent collects some reward r(u, v) after traversing
the edge (u, v). Note that the reward is only collected after the current time step, so its value does not get
multiplied by b.
Let Ri be the minimum reward that can be distributed among the edges to motivate the agent to reach t and
let Rd be the minimal reward required to motivate the agent to reach t in any subgraph of G (i.e. enabling
edge deletion). We first observe that internal rewards cannot be more powerful than arbitrary deletion (i.e.,
Ri ≥ Rd). To see why, let P be the path that the agent takes in the graph with internal rewards Ri. It has
to be the case that if the agent traverses P in the graph it will also traverse it in isolation (as established in
Claim 3.5). Now, for a path in isolation it is easy to see that the best way to distribute rewards is put all of
them at t. Thus, the agent will traverse P for a reward of Ri on t.
Moreover, edge deletion is strictly more powerful than internal rewards as we illustrate next.
Example 3.7 The graph in Figure 10 with b = 4 and R = 52. G′ is traversable under these parameters,
but G is not. Furthermore, it is impossible to distribute R along the edges of G to make it traversable.
s u
v
w t
8 10
5 6
10
(a) G
s u w t
8 10 10
(b) G′
Figure 10: With b = 4 and R = 52, it is impossible to distribute R such that the agent follows the s→ u→
w → t path
With a more complex construction, we show the following in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 3.8 There exist instances in which the ratio between Rd and Ri is as high as 2− ε for any ε > 0.
Combining the facts in this section with the result of Theorem 3.2, we have the following chain of inequal-
ities that summarizes the relationships among the quantities we have considered: Co(s) ≤ Rd ≤ Ri ≤
Rmin ≤ bCo(s).
3.3 Two Open Questions
Finally, we note two interesting open questions based on the results of this section.
First, because we can determine for any R whether the agent will traverse for a reward of R at t, it follows
that there is a simple pseudo-polynomial algorithm to find the minimum R∗ at t for which G is traversable:
we simple try each value of R up to bCo(s) and take the minimum. However, because the set of R for
which G is traversable need not form a connected set, there is no natural way to use the decision procedure
for a single R to perform binary for the minimum R. Indeed, it is an intriguing open question whether the
minimum reward R∗ can be found in polynomial time.
Second, as noted above, we do not know how large the ratio of Ri to Rd can be.
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4 Reward Seeking Behavior
So far, we have focused on present-biased agents who seek to minimize the cost they incur. However, we
could also consider a model that consists only of rewards — each edge (u, v) has a reward r(u, v), and the
agent seeks to maximize the reward that it collects while traversing the graph. In this model, the value Rs(u)
of the path that a sophisticated agent takes starting from u can be defined as follows:
Rs(u) = r(u, S
(R)
s (u)) +Rs(S
(R)
s (u)) where S(R)s (u) = argmax
v:(u,v)∈E
b · r(u, v) +Rs(v).
In this model, the optimal reward is the weight of the heaviest path from v to t (denoted by Ro(v)). With
these definitions, we can again consider the ratio of rewards collected by the optimal agent to that collected
by a sophisticated agent; we refer to this as the reward ratio. O’Donoghue and Rabin [8] have observed
that in reward settings sophisticated agents can do quite badly as they tend to collect rewards much earlier
than they should. In the following example we show that this principle holds in a strong sense for our
graph-theoretic model: the reward ratio for sophisticated agents can be exponential in the size of the graph.
Example 4.1 Consider the fan graph in Figure 11 with the value of c set slightly below b; more generally,
such a graph could have n nodes vi with an edge (vi, t) of reward ci. By reverse induction from vn, a
sophisticated agent can work out that from vi it would prefer to go directly to t (obtaining a perceived
reward of bci) than to continue on to vi+1 (where, by induction, it would go directly to t, for a perceived
reward of ci+1). The consequence of this induction is that the agent will go directly from s to t, obtaining a
reward of 1. Intuitively, the agent is smart enough to predict that each of its future selves will go directly to
t, and so it would rather go directly to t immediately.
s
v1
v2
v3
v4t
0
0 0
0
1
c
c2
c3
c4
Figure 11: Reward ratio bO(n) for sophisticated agent
Interestingly, and in contrast to sophisticated agents, naive agents are doing quite well in reward settings.
For the graph in Figure 11 a naive agent will collect a reward of cn−1 (since it naively believes it is going to
reach vn all the way until it gets to vn−1). More generally, we show that in any graph the reward ratio for a
naive agent is at most b. First, we observe that the reward that a naive agent will collect starting at u is:
Rn(u) = r(u, S
(R)
n (u)) +Rn(S
(R)
n (u)) where S(R)n (u) = argmax
v:(u,v)∈E
b · r(u, v) +Ro(v).
Next we show that the reward ratio for a naive agent is bounded by doing an induction over the node’s height
Claim 4.2 The reward ratio for a naive agent is at most b (b ·Rn(s) ≥ Ro(s)).
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Proof: Consider some node u from which the optimal agent goes to vo and the naive agent goes to vn.
Assume inductively that the claim holds for vn and vo. Then, by using the induction assumption we have
that :
b ·Rn(u) = b · c(u, vn) + b ·Rn(vn)
≥ b · c(u, vn) +Ro(vn)
Since the naive agent prefers vn over vo we have that
b · Rn(u) ≥ b · c(u, vn) +Ro(vn)
≥ b · c(u, vo) +Ro(vo)
≥ c(u, vo) +Ro(vo) = Ro(u)
4.1 Commitment Devices for Sophisticated Agents
In example in Figure 11 above, we observed that sophisticated agents can exhibit a high reward ratio. Since
sophisticated agents are able to plan accurately about their own biases, it is reasonable to consider ways they
can modify the instance to achieve better performance. Such methods are referred to as commitment devices
in the literature, and they can be viewed as ways of committing one’s future self to a constrained course of
action [2]. For example, a sophisticated individual who believes they have a problem with spending too
much might put most of their money in a savings program that makes withdrawal costly or difficult.
In this section we explore three ways of modeling commitment devices, together with guarantees that apply
to the set of all graphs. We motivate them using the example in Figure 11.
1. Paying now to increase the reward later. We note that in Figure 11, increasing the reward on the edge
(v4, t) even by a small ε suffices to make the agent behave optimally and hence increase its reward expo-
nentially. The small increase in the reward on the edge (v4, t) will cause the agent at v3 prefer continuing
to v4. Given this the agent at v2 will continue to v3 instead of going directly to t and so on. This means that
the agent at s will be willing to pay quite a lot to increase the reward on the edge (v4, t). Formalizing this
idea we define a commitment device with a “planning phase” that allows the agent at s to pay any cost B
and in return distribute an equivalent amount of reward along the edges. Since the agent is present-biased
the perceived cost of spending this budget at the planning phase is b · B and not just B. In Appendix C.1
we analyze this commitment device and show that (although it helps considerably for the example in Figure
11) there are instances in which even with this device the reward ratio remains exponential.
2. Adding bypasses. In Figure 11, consider adding a direct edge of reward 0 directly from s to v4. Adding
such an edge will make the agent traverse the path s → v4 → t and collect the maximum reward. In
Appendix C.2 we show that by adding such edges we can guarantee that the reward of the agent in the
new graph will be at least 1bn of the reward of the optimal agent in the original graph. This corresponds
to an exponential improvement in the worst-case guarantee. However, there are instances in which adding
zero-reward edges cannot increase the agent’s reward beyond this factor.
3. Deleting edges. Finally, we observe that in Figure 11, if we delete the edge (v3, t) the agent will traverse
the optimal path. Using edge deletion to model commitment devices is both powerful (as we will see next)
and captures standard commitment devices which are used in practice such as deadlines (putting a deadline
on some task “deletes” the option to do the task on any time after the deadline). In the next subsection we
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show that by deleting at most an ε fraction of the edges we can reduce the reward ratio by an exponential
amount in the worst case, bringing the sophisticated agent’s performance on the modified graph to within a
factor of Ω(n−ε/2) of the optimal in the original graph.
4.2 Bounding Edge Removal
Based on the final commitment device considered above — deleting edges — we consider the following
problem: Given a graph G, remove some fraction of the edges it to improve the reward that a sophisticated
agent will collect. Here we show that by removing an arbitrarily small constant fraction of the edges, we
can increase the agent’s reward in the modified graph to be within a polynomial factor of the optimal reward
in the original graph:
Theorem 4.3 For any DAG G with |V | > b and any k > 2 we can remove 2|E|k edges such that the reward
of a sophisticated agent in the modified instance (denoted by R′s(s)) is a factor of at least n−k times the
optimal reward in the original instance (denoted by R∗). That is, R′s(s) ≥ R∗n−k.
Proof: We begin with some intuition for the proof. The basic idea is that at each vertex where the agent
chooses to follow a path other than the optimal path, the ratio between the perceived reward on the path the
agent takes and on the optimal path is at most b. This suggests that by removing all edges with rewards in an
interval (bj , bj+1) we can guarantee that if the optimal path is of weight at least bj+1, then the sophisticated
agent will not choose a path of weight less than bj . Stated this simply, the reasoning works for fan graphs as
in Figure 11, but not in general, since in fan graphs the fact that the optimal path has a reward greater than
bj+1 in particular implies that there is an edge with at least this reward. For more general graphs, we need to
be more careful and remove edges admitting rewards in a larger interval to make sure that there are no paths
with rewards in this interval. This idea is formalized in the next claim
Claim 4.4 For any DAG G with optimal reward R∗ = Ro(s) and n = |V | > b, if no edge outside of the
optimal s− t path Po has reward within the interval (R∗n−j−1, R∗n−j+1) for j > 1, then Rs(s) ≥ R∗n−j .
Proof: We name the vertices of the path Po by their order from t to s. That is u0 = t, u1 is the vertex
closest to t on the path and so on. We will show by induction on the vertices of the path Po that for each
vertex ui ∈ Po, we have Rs(ui) ≥ min(Ro(ui), R∗n−j+1)−R∗(i− 1)(b− 1)n−j−1.
Base case: At t, we have Rs(t) ≥ Ro(t) = 0.
Inductive hypothesis: For the vertex ui−1 on Po, we have
Rs(ui−1) ≥ min(Ro(ui−1), R
∗n−j+1)−R∗(i− 1)(b − 1)n−j−1.
Inductive step: Consider the vertex ui on Po. Let vs be the next vertex that the agent visits and let vo be the
next vertex along Po.
If r(ui, vs) ≥ R∗n−j+1, then the claim is trivially true because Rs(ui) ≥ r(ui, vs) ≥ R∗n−j+1. Therefore,
we will only consider r(ui, vs) ≤ R∗n−j−1 (it cannot be between those values by assumption).
Because the agent chooses to go to vs instead of vo, we have b ·r(ui, vs)+Rs(vs) ≥ b ·r(ui, vo)+Rs(vo) ≥
r(ui, vo) +min(Ro(vo), R
∗n−j+1)−R∗(i− 1)(b− 1)n−j−1. Subtracting (b− 1)r(ui, vs) from both sides
and using the assumption that r(ui, vs) ≤ R∗n−j−1, we have
r(ui, vs) +Rs(vs) ≥ r(ui, vo) + min(Ro(vo), R
∗n−j+1)−R∗(i− 1)(b− 1)n−j−1 − (b− 1)r(ui, vs)
≥ min(r(ui, vo) +Ro(vo), R
∗n−j+1)−R∗i(b− 1)n−j−1
Thus, the inductive step holds.
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Finally, since Po has at most n edges between s and t, this means Rs(s) ≥ min(Ro(s), R∗n−j+1)−R∗n(b−
1)n−j−1 = min(R∗, R∗n−j+1)−R∗n(b− 1)n−j−1 = R∗(n−j+1 − (b− 1)n−j) ≥ R∗n−j.
We can now use Claim 4.4 to complete the proof of Theorem 4.3. Note that there are at most |E| edges with
reward in the interval (R∗n−k−1, R∗), which we can divide into the overlapping intervals
(R∗n−k−1, R∗n−k+1), (R∗n−k, R∗n−k+2), (R∗n−k+1, R∗n−k+3), . . . , (R∗n−2, R∗). Each edge can fall into
at most two such intervals. There are k such intervals. Thus, the average interval has at most 2|E|k edges in it.
This means that there is some interval with at most 2|E|k edges in it. Let this interval be (R
∗n−j−1, R∗n−j+1)
with j ≤ k. To produce the modified graph G′, we remove all edges from this interval that do not lie on the
optimal path. Using Claim 4.4, we know that if G′ has no edges outside the optimal path with reward in the
interval (R∗n−j−1, R∗nj+1), then R′s(s) ≥ R∗n−j ≥ R∗n−k.
5 Conclusion
In this work we incorporated the notion of sophistication into a graph-theoretic model of planning, and
thereby provided a set of new guarantees about the performance of sophisticated agents with present bias.
Our formalism makes it possible to identify basic new insights about the behavior of such agents. These
include the fact that their performance is at most a factor of b worse than optimal; that the worst-case
performance of partially naive agents displays a sharp transition at the boundary between optimism and
pessimism; that rewards for motivating sophisticated agents can display a surprising form of non-monotone
behavior; and that any instance for a reward-seeking sophisticated agent with a bad performance ratio can
be dramatically improved by deleting small fraction of the instance.
Our work leaves open a number of interesting questions. We have identified some specific questions in
the text thus far, and highlight the following additional ones here. First, can we say anything about the
average-case performance of sophisticated and partially naive agents on ensembles of instances defined by
a natural family of random graphs? It is possible that particular models might exhibit contrasts at the level
of average-case performance even though they do not at the level of worst-case performance. Second, can
we characterize the set of paths traversed by a sophisticated agent on a given graph as we vary the value of
b? Such a characterization might yield a bound on the number of possible paths over all values of b, or allow
us to analyze agents whose belief about their value of b is drawn from a distribution rather than pinned to
a specific value. And finally, it would be interesting to understand the power of commitment devices more
fully, both through the development of other plausible families of commitment devices, and through tighter
bounds on the ones studied here.
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A Partially Naive Agents
A partially naive agent is an agent that has present bias b but believes it has a bias b′. In the case where
b = b′, the agent is fully sophisticated. In the case where b′ = 1, the agent is naive.
Let Cp(u) be the cost for a partially naive agent with parameters b and b′ to go from u to the goal t. Let
C ′s(u) be the cost for a fully sophisticated agent with parameter b′ to go from u to the goal t. The cost of the
path that a partially naive agent takes is:
Cp(u) = c(u, Sp(u)) + Cp(Sp(u)) where Sp(u) = argmin
v:(u,v)∈E
b · c(u, v) + C ′s(v).
We will consider two types of partially sophisticated agents: optimistic (b′ < b) and pessimistic (b′ > b).
A.1 Optimistic Partially Naive
The path taken by an optimistic partially naive agent can have cost ratio bO(n) where n is the number of
vertices. In the graph shown in Figure 12, at each vertex vi, the agent has a choice between going directly
to t, which has a perceived cost of bi+1, or proceeding to vi+1. Since the agent believes it has bias b′, it
believes that at vi+1, it will proceed to t since b′bi+1 < bi+2. Therefore, the perceived cost of the path
vi → vi+1 → t is bi+1. If we choose the tie breaking scheme to favor vi+1 over vi (or subtract ε from the
weights as necessary), we can get the agent to follow the path s → v1 → v2 → v3 → v4 → t, which has
cost b4, instead of the optimal path s → t which has cost 1. It is easy to see that the same analysis on a fan
of size n would show that its cost ratio is bO(n).
s
v1
v2
v3
v4t
0
0 0
0
1
b
b2
b3
b4
Figure 12: Cost ratio bO(n) for optimistic partially sophisticated agent
A.2 Pessimistic Partially Sophisticated
Claim A.1 The path taken by a pessimistic partially sophisticated agent can have cost ratio at most b′.
Proof: We use induction on the height of the vertex to show that Cp(u) ≤ C ′s(u) for every node u in
the graph. Recall that C ′s(u) ≤ b′ · Co(u) by Theorem 2.1. As this holds for s in particular we have that
Cp(s) ≤ b
′ · Co(s), as required. We now provide the inductive argument showing that Cp(u) ≤ C ′s(u).
Base case: Cp(t) = 0, C ′s(t) = 0.
Inductive hypothesis: For a vertex u of height k, Cp(u) ≤ C ′s(u).
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Inductive step: For a vertex u of height k + 1, let vp = Sp(u) and vs′ = S′s(u). Since the partially
sophisticated agent chose to go to vp and the fully sophisticated agent chose to go to vs′ , we know
b · c(u, vp) + C
′
s(vp) ≤ b · c(u, vs′) + C
′
s(vs′)
b′ · c(u, vp) + C
′
s(vp) ≥ b
′ · c(u, vs′) + C
′
s(vs′)
Subtracting one equation from the other, we have (b′ − b) · c(u, vp) ≥ (b′ − b) · c(u, vs′) implying that
c(u, vp) ≥ c(u, vs′).
Since b · c(u, vp) + C ′s(vp) ≤ b · c(u, vs′) + C ′s(vs′) and c(u, vp) ≥ c(u, vs′), we have that c(u, vp) +
C ′s(vp) ≤ c(u, vs′) + C
′
s(vs′). By the induction hypothesis, we have that Cp(vp) ≤ C ′s(vp). This implies
that c(u, vp) +Cp(vp) ≤ C ′s(u), and hence Cp(u) ≤ C ′s(u).
The example in Figure 13 shows that this bound is tight.
s u
v
w
t
0
0
1
0
b′
b′ − ε
Figure 13: Worst case scenario for a pessimistic partially sophisticated agent
A.3 Naive Future-biased Agent
The following result is about naive agents and not sophisticated ones. However, since the proof follows a
similar path to the proofs for the bounds on the cost ratio for sophisticated agents we include it in this paper.
A future-biased agent is a naive agent that has bias b < 1. Let Cf be the perceived cost function for a
future-biased agent. The decision rule is the same for any naive agent:
Sf (u) = argmin
v:(u,v)∈E
b · c(u, v) + Co(v)
Claim A.2 The cost ratio for a future-biased agent is at most 1b .
Proof: We proceed by induction on the height of the vertex.
Base case: Cf (t) = 0, Co(t) = 0.
Inductive hypothesis: For a vertex u of height k, Cf (u) ≤ 1bCo(u).
Inductive step: Consider a vertex u of height k + 1. Let vf = Sf (u) and vo = So(u). Since the future-
biased agent chose to go to vf , we have that b ·c(u, vf )+Co(vf ) ≤ b ·c(u, vo)+Co(vo). Using the induction
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hypothesis, which says that Co(vf ) ≥ b ·Cf (vf ), and because b < 1, we have that b ·c(u, vf )+b ·Cf (vf ) ≤
Co(u) which implies that b · Cf (u) ≤ Co(u) as required.
The example in Figure 14 shows that this bound is tight.
s
v
t
1
b
0 1
Figure 14: Worst case scenario for a future-biased agent
B Traversable Rewards
B.1 Exponential Traversable Paths
Here, we provide a proof that the graph G shown in Figure 9 has exponentially many distinct paths taken
by the agent for various values of the reward placed at t. Recall that for any path in G, we define the bit
string x whose ith bit is 0 if the path contains the direct vi → vi+1 edge and 1 if the path contains the edges
vi → wi → vi+1.
Number the bits representing x from 0 (least significant bit) to n− 1 (most significant bit). For a number x
such that 0 ≤ x ≤ 2n − 1, let Q = {i | the ith bit of x is a 1}. Proceeding by induction from n− 1 to 0, we
will show that for a reward of 2n + (bc − 2)x, if i ∈ Q, then agent would be willing to go through wi, and
if i /∈ Q, then the agent would be willing to go directly to vi+1 from vi but not through wi.
Let xi be the i-truncated version of x, meaning that all bits strictly less significant than the ith bit are set to
0.
Case 1: i ∈ Q. Then, the perceived cost of going through wi is
b · c · 2i +
∑
i<j<n,j∈Q
c · 2j +
∑
i<j<n,j /∈Q
2j = b · c · 2i +
∑
i<j<n
2j +
∑
i<j<n,j∈Q
(c− 1)2j
= b · c · 2i + 2n − 2i+1 + (c− 1)xi+1
= 2n + (bc− 2)2i + (bc− 2)xi+1 (because 1 + c = bc)
= 2n + (bc− 2)xi
≤ 2n + (bc− 2)x
Therefore, if i ∈ Q, then the agent is willing to go to wi. Because c ≤ b (and we can break ties by always
choosing wi over vi+1), at vi, the agent will choose to go to wi.
Case 2: i /∈ Q. Then, the perceived cost of going through wi is again 2n + (bc − 2)2i + (bc − 2)xi+1.
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However,
x =
∑
0≤j≤i,j∈Q
2j + xi+1
=
∑
0≤j<i,j∈Q
2j + xi+1
≤
i−1∑
j=0
2j + xi+1
< 2i + xi+1
Therefore, the perceived cost of going through wi is
2n + (bc− 2)(2i + xi+1) > 2
n + (bc− 2)x
and thus, the agent would not be willing to go through wi. The perceived cost of going directly from vi to
vi+1, however, is
b · 2i + 2n − 2i+1 + (c− 1)xi+1 = 2
n + (b− 2)2i + (bc− 2)xi+1
< 2n + (bc− 2)x (because b < 2)
In either case, the agent follows the path corresponding to the binary representation of x. Thus, by induction,
for a reward of 2n + (bc− 2)x, the agent must follow this path.
Since every number between 0 and 2n− 1 can be represented by paths in this graph, under these conditions,
there are an exponential number of different paths that the agent takes as the reward varies.
It is interesting to note that the only way we can have b = c is to set them both to the golden ratio φ.
B.2 Ratio between Internal Rewards and Edge Deletion
s v1 v2 · · · vn−1 vn t
y0 y1 yn−1 yn
p1 pn−1
Figure 15: G such that 2Rd ≈ Ri
Consider the graph in Figure 15. Let Rd be the minimal reward required if the agent can delete edges from
the graph, and let Ri be the minimal reward required if the agent can distribute the reward internally. Then,
we make the following definitions:
yi =
(
b
b− 1
)i
pi = yi +
pi−1
2
p1 =
(b+ 1)yi
2
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The curved paths represent paths made up by a seriew of low-weight edges, such that the perceived cost is
equal (within a factor of ε) to the true cost. From each vi, the perceived cost of taking the direct edge to
vi+1 is byi, while the perceived cost of taking the longer path is pi. If deletion is allowed, then from each vi
(and s), the perceived cost of the optimal path with deletion is Rd = b
(
b
b−1
)n
. However, by only allowing
internal reward placement, since the perceived cost of following the (vn, t) edge is b
(
b
b−1
)n
, meaning that
the agent must place that much reward just on the last edge. Consider each vertex inductively backwards
from vn – in order to motivate the agent to get from vi to vi+1, we can either place enough reward on the
direct edge to bring the perceived cost down below pi, or we can allow the agent to take the longer bypass
sequence of edges. However, if it takes the longer sequence, this adds pi − yi to the total cost to the path,
meaning that the overall reward required is increased by pi − yi. Since the reward required to bring the
perceived cost of following the optimal path down to pi is byi − pi, we choose pi so as to make the agent
indifferent to both choices. Let Di be the amount of additional reward needed to motivate the agent to get
past vi. Then, we have Di = byi − pi = pi − yi +Di−1 =
∑i
j=1(pi − yi).
First, we observe that if we place reward of byi − pi on the direct (vi, vi+1) edge, then this is enough to
motivate the agent to get past vi. This is because if the agent follows every bypass before vi, it incurs an
additional cost of
∑i−1
j=1(pi−yi) = Di−1. Since by definition byi−pi = Di = pi−yi+Di−1, the additional
reward placed on the optimal (vi, vi−1) edge is enough to motivate the agent to take all the bypasses up to
vi−1. However, if instead we place a reward of pi− yi on the bypass from vi to vi+1, from any vertex before
vi, the perceived cost of the path is the same as it would be if the agent took the optimal (vi, vi+1) edge.
Thus, inductively, the agent still has to be motivated to get to vi−1, which by induction takes an additional
reward of Di−1. Therefore, we want the agent to be indifferent between motivating the direct edge and
motivating the bypass, meaning
byi − pi = pi − yi +Di−1
(b+ 1)yi = 2pi + byi−1 − pi−1
(b+ 1)yi = 2pi + b
(
b− 1
b
)
yi − pi−1
yi (b+ 1− (b− 1)) + pi−1 = 2pi
yi +
pi−1
2
= pi
which matches the above definition. Furthermore,
by1 − p1 = p1 − y1
(b+ 1)y1 = 2p1
(b+ 1)y1
2
= p1
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Thus, we can explicitly solve for pi:
pi =
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
+
i∑
j=2
(
b
b− 1
)j
2j−i
=
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
+ 2−i
(
2b
b− 1
) i−1∑
j=1
(
2b
b− 1
)j
=
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
+ 2−i
(
2b
b− 1
)2
(
2b
b−1
)i−1
− 1
2b
b−1 − 1


=
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
+ 2−i+2
(
b
b− 1
)2
(
2b
b−1
)i−1
− 1
b+1
b−1


=
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
+
(
b2
2i−2(b+ 1)(b − 1)
)((
2b
b− 1
)i−1
− 1
)
Using this, we have
Di = byi − pi
= b
(
b
b− 1
)i
−
(b+ 1)b
(b− 1)2i
−
(
b2
2i−2(b+ 1)(b− 1)
)((
2b
b− 1
)i−1
− 1
)
=
(
b
b− 1
)i(
b−
2b
b+ 1
)
+
b
2i
(
4b
b2 − 1
−
b+ 1
b− 1
)
=
(
b
b− 1
)i(b2 − b
b+ 1
)
+
b
2i
(
−b2 + 2b− 1
b2 − 1
)
=
(
b
b− 1
)i(b(b− 1)
b+ 1
)
−
b
2i
(
b− 1
b+ 1
)
=
b(b− 1)
b+ 1
((
b
b− 1
)i
−
1
2i
)
Since Dn−1 is the additional reward required to get the agent past the first n − 1 vertices, we have Ri =
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b
(
b
b−1
)n
+Dn−1. This makes the ratio
Ri
Rd
=
b
(
b
b−1
)n
+Dn−1
b
(
b
b−1
)n
= 1 +
b(b−1)
b+1
((
b
b−1
)n−1
− 1
2n−1
)
b
(
b
b−1
)n
= 1 +
(
b− 1
b+ 1
)(
b− 1
b
)
− 2
(
b− 1
2b
)n
= 1 +
(
(b− 1)2
b(b+ 1)
)
− 2
(
b− 1
2b
)n
For large enough b and n, this ratio approaches 2.
C Commitment Devices
C.1 Planning Agents
We consider the “planning agent” described in Section 4.1. First, we observe that the agent would never
place on a reward on an edge that it would not traverse. Since the agent is sophisticated, it knows exactly
which path it will take through a graph, and thus the path would not be affected by increasing the reward on
an edge that the agent knows it will not take.
Let Ro(s) and Rs(s) denote the rewards achieved by the optimal and sophisticated agents respectively
through the graph. Let Rp(s) denote the reward achieved by a sophisticated agent which is allowed to have
this planning phase. Let B be the total reward that the planning agent distributes along the edges.
Claim C.1 The amount of additional reward a planning agent can add to the graph is at most the difference
between the optimal reward and the reward received by a standard sophisticated agent divided by b− 1. In
other words,
B ≤
Ro(s)−Rs(s)
b− 1
Proof: Since the perceived cost of taking on a cost of B during the planning phase is b · B, we know that
the planning agent must get a reward of at least Rs(s)+ b ·B. However, we know that Rp(s) ≤ Ro(s)+B,
since the best the planning agent can do is follow the optimal path and reclaim the reward of B that it put
along the edges. Thus,
Ro(s) +B ≥ Rp(s)
≥ Rs(s) + b · B
Ro(s)−Rs(s) ≥ (b− 1)B
Ro(s)−Rs(s)
b− 1
≥ B
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Claim C.2 There are graphs for which a planning agent has an exponentially bad reward ratio.
Proof: Consider the graph in Figure 16, with xi =
(
b(b−1)
2b−1
)i
. We will show that it is impossible for a
planning agent to take any path other than s→ t.
Assume towards contradiction that there is some k such that the planning agent can take the path s→ v1 →
· · · → vk → t. This means that the agent will receive a reward of xk + B. However, since the perceived
cost of adding a reward of B to the graph is b · B during the planning phase, we know
Rs(s) + b ·B ≤ xk +B
B ≤
xk − 1
b− 1
(Rs(s) = 1)
However, in order to motivate the agent to go from vk−1 to vk, the perceived reward of vk−1 → t must be
less than the perceived reward of vk−1 → vk → t. Let Bk be the reward placed on the vk−1 → vk edge.
This means
bxk−1 ≤ b ·Bk + xk
≤ b ·B + xk
≤ b
(
xk − 1
b− 1
)
+ xk
=
(
2b− 1
b− 1
)
xk −
b
b− 1
xk−1 ≤
(
2b− 1
b(b− 1)
)
xk −
b
b− 1
This is a contradiction because by definition, xk−1 =
(
2b−1
b(b−1)
)
xk. Thus, the agent cannot reach xk for any
k ≥ 1, so it can only take the path s→ t.
s
v1
v2
v3
v4t
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0
1
x1
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x3
x4
Figure 16: Exponentially bad reward ratio for planning agent.
C.2 Zero-Reward Edges
We consider the second commitment device described in Section 4.1, by which an agent can add edges of
reward zero to the graph.
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Claim C.3 The reward ratio for an agent that can add zero-reward edges is at most bn, where n is the
number of nodes in the graph. In other words,
bn · Rz(s) ≥ Ro(s)
Proof: Let Rz(s) be the maximum reward attainable by a sophisticated agent allowed to add zero-reward
edges to the graph. Assume that the reward ratio without adding any zero-reward edges is larger than than
bn, meaning that bnRs(s) < Ro(s) (if not, then the claim holds trivially). Since there are n vertices, the path
taken by the optimal agent must have length at most n. Therefore, there must be some edge on that path with
reward at least Ro(s)n > b · Rs(s). This means that if the zero-reward agent were to add an edge of reward
0 from s to the beginning of the edge of maximum reward along the sophisticated agent’s path, the agent
would prefer to take the zero reward edge, as the perceived reward of doing so is more than bRs(s), while
the perceived reward of not taking the zero-reward edge and following the rest of the sophisticated agent’s
path is at most bRs(s). Thus, the zero-reward agent would achieve a reward of at least Ro(s)n , meaning its
reward ratio would be smaller than bn.
Figure 17 shows that it’s possible for the reward ratio between the optimal agent and the sophisticated agent
to be linear and for zero-reward edges to have no benefit. The optimal agent gets a reward of n(b − 1), but
the sophisticated agent gets a reward of 1 (assuming ties are broken by choosing the largest outgoing edge).
Furthermore, there is no way to add zero-reward edges to the graph to increase the reward received by the
sophisticated agent.
s
v′1 v1
v′2
v2
v′3
v3 v′4
v4t
0
b− 1
0
b− 1 0
b− 1
0
b− 1
1
1 1
1
1
Figure 17: No benefit to adding zero-reward edges.
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